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Panhandling and the First
Amendment
HOW SPIDER-MAN IS REDUCING THE QUALITY OF
LIFE IN NEW YORK CITY
“The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken
window.”1
INTRODUCTION
Junior Bishop is not someone police would consider your
typical “friendly neighborhood Spider-Man.”2 In July 2014, in
New York City’s Times Square, Bishop, who was dressed as Stan
Lee’s famous superhero, harassed a woman for tips after he posed
with her in a picture.3 When a New York City Police Department
(NYPD) officer intervened, Bishop punched him in the face.4 Later
that year, the NYPD arrested a woman dressed as Elmo for
aggressive solicitation and posted a picture of the handcuffed
character on Twitter.5 A caption accompanying the photograph
read, “Just another typical day in Midtown South.”6 When walking
along Manhattan’s famous crossroads, a pedestrian can spot not
only costumed panhandlers but also topless women, called
“desnudas,”7 and even a musician who strategically holds his guitar

1 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 34.
2 BadWolf, Spiderman 1967 Cartoon Intro (with Lyrics), YOUTUBE (Dec. 13,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A43sHQ9BKxg [http://perma.cc/WV9U-TW84].
3 Ryan Sit & Thomas Tracy, Man Dressed as Spider-Man Punches NYPD Cop in
Times Square, Authorities Say, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/man-dressed-spider-man-punches-nypd-ti
mes-square-article-1.1881561 [http://perma.cc/J6HJ-WLBV].
4 Id.
5 Jamie Schram & Aaron Feis, Elmo in Handcuffs After Times Square Bust,
N.Y. POST (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/09/16/elmo-in-handcuffsafter-times-square-bust/ [http://perma.cc/HC75-S9T3].
6 Id.
7 Colleen Wright, The Desnudas of Times Square, Topless but for the Paint,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/nyregion/the-desnudas
-of-times-square-topless-but-for-the-paint.html [http://perma.cc/JHD5-R3FP].
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to make it appear that he is wearing nothing but a cowboy hat.8
These individuals ply their “talents” in an attempt to earn tips
from the city’s visitors, often leaving their manners behind. One
survey showed that 60% of those who work near Times Square
have had distasteful interactions with the panhandlers.9
The Times Square panhandlers have earned the ire of the
media and the city’s elected officials. Local newspapers have
published apoplectic editorials and letters to the editor that
bemoan how the panhandlers conduct themselves and draw
allusions to the “seediness” that defined 1970s midtown
Manhattan—when sex shops and X-rated theaters were all the
rage.10 New York State Senator Brad Hoylman described the
costumed street performers as “a cancer on Times Square that
has to be excised soon.”11 And, in the summer of 2015, Governor
Andrew Cuomo stated that the activity “infring[es] on the
investment that the state and the city made in [Times Square]”
and that he believes it “has to be stopped.”12 The problem that the
panhandlers pose affects more than just midtown Manhattan.
Recently, they have spread beyond Times Square and moved into
other areas of the city, including Battery Park and Coney Island.13
8 See Turner Cowles, How Times Square’s Naked Cowboy Makes $150,000 a
Year, TIME (Oct. 6, 2015), http://time.com/money/4060713/naked-cowboy-times-squaremakes-money/ [http://perma.cc/Y7AC-699S].
9 David K. Li, Times Square Leader Rails Against Creeps, N.Y. POST (Oct. 4,
2015, 11:29 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/10/04/times-square-leader-rails-against-creeps/
[http://perma.cc/N5TZ-J3KJ] (citing a survey that asked respondents whether they had
ever experienced an “unpleasant interaction with either a solicitor or a costumed
performer where they really felt intruded upon in a negative way”).
10 See, e.g., Where the Money Is for Panhandlers (Editorial), STATEN ISLAND
ADVANCE (Aug. 28 2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.silive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/08/
where_the_money_is_for_panhand.html [http://perma.cc/W48D-KRRV] (stating that the
topless panhandlers have created an atmosphere that “has just a whiff of that old, 1970sstyle Times Square seediness that Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg worked so hard
to dispel”); Jack Hassid, Letter to the Editor, Topless Women in Times Square, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/opinion/topless-women-intimes-square.html [http://perma.cc/23TV-VE3K] (describing Times Square as a “sterile,
character-less Disney theme park”); Andrea Peyser, Times Square’s Costumed Menaces
Are the New Squeegee Men, N.Y. POST (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:07 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/08/
01/its-time-to-crack-down-on-the-times-square-extortionists/
[http://perma.cc/96T3-ZCEL]
(calling Times Square a “bizzaro Disneyland” and describing the costumed panhandlers’
conduct as “extortion”).
11 Paula Duran, Pols Promise a Solution Against “Elmo Bullies,” OBSERVER
(July 9, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://observer.com/2014/07/pols-promise-a-solution-againstelmo-bullies/ [http://perma.cc/NL89-HPGM].
12 Chester Soria, Cuomo Calls Times Square Topless Panhandler Activity ‘Illegal,’
METRO (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.metro.us/new-york/cuomo-calls-times-square-toplesspanhandler-activity-illegal/zsJohs---vOzLGp87jyJGs/ [http://perma.cc/8AUA-ZKDR].
13 Erin Durkin et al., EXCLUSIVE: Aggressive Panhandling Costumed
Characters Spread from Times Square to the Battery, Coney Island, Sparking Turf War,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
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Regulating the costumed and bare-breasted panhandlers
has become a priority for New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and
the New York City Council. In August 2015, de Blasio appointed a
panel to find ways to rein in the city’s unpleasant soliciting
activity.14 This task force has made several recommendations,
which include deploying a special police detail in Times Square,
informing tourists about how to avoid unwanted contact with the
panhandlers, and establishing “special zones” for solicitation.15
One year earlier, Councilman Andy King proposed legislation
that would require costumed panhandlers to purchase licenses
before soliciting and would further crack down on aggressive
behavior.16 Mayor de Blasio has even considered tearing out the
pedestrian plazas, which the city installed before he assumed
office.17 In April 2016, the City Council passed a law limiting
panhandling activity to certain designated areas.18
Law enforcement has struggled to bring order to Times
Square because constitutional free speech protections limit what
it can do to regulate panhandling. In an editorial to the Wall
Street Journal, NYPD Commissioner William Bratton explained
that police are in a position where they must deal with behavior
that is “awful” but that courts have deemed to be “lawful.”19
Bratton noted that, since the early 1990s, courts have limited the
tools—specifically, laws prohibiting disorderly conduct, public
nudity, and begging—that law enforcement can use to curb
panhandling.20 For example, in 1992, the New York Court of
york/panhandling-costumed-characters-spread-parts-nyc-article-1.2337391 [http://perma.cc/
6XTX-5Q7R].
14 Mara Gay & Pervaiz Shallwani, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio Appoints Second
Panel on Panhandling, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2015, 8:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
nyc-mayor-bill-de-blasio-to-appoint-second-panel-on-panhandling-1440621246 [http://perma.
cc/9GW3-937A].
15 Mallory Hoff, Mayor de Blasio’s Times Square Task Force Releases Its
Recommendations, ABC7NY.COM (Oct. 1, 2015), http://abc7ny.com/news/times-squaretask-force-releases-its-recommendations/1010497/ [http://perma.cc/5PGX-HL6J].
16 N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 0467-2014 (N.Y. 2014), http://legistar.council.nyc.
gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1903343&GUID=5A45C651-7373-4589-86B4-F77DD0F
D5CFC&Options=ID|Text|&Search=costume [http://perma.cc/X72D-U36U].
17 Michael M. Grynbaum & Matt Flegenheimer, Mayor de Blasio Raises
Prospect of Removing Times Square Pedestrian Plazas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/21/nyregion/mayor-de-blasio-raises-prospect-of-removin
g-times-square-pedestrian-plazas.html [http://perma.cc/P4UV-DP34].
18 Mara Gay, New York City Moves to Bring Order to Times Square, Restrict
Panhandlers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2016, 12:08 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorkcity-moves-to-bring-order-to-times-square-restrict-panhandlers-1460074231 [http://perma.cc
/78MV-BEZ6].
19 William J. Bratton, Policing ‘Awful But Lawful’ Times Square Panhandling,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2015, 6:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/policing-awful-but-lawfultimes-square-panhandling-1441406768 [http://perma.cc/N69Y-GKPU].
20 Id.
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Appeals indicated that it might violate equal protection to
prohibit only women from going topless in public and—to avoid
the constitutional question—construed an unlawful exposure
statute to be inapplicable in a noncommercial setting.21 At around
the same time, the Second Circuit concluded that panhandling
was expressive conduct that warranted First Amendment
protection.22 And more recently, a New York appellate court held
that a criminal statute punishing “loitering for the purpose of
begging” infringed the beggar’s free speech rights.23
Rulings of this sort conflict with the NYPD’s approach to
reducing the city’s crime rate during the past 25 years. This
approach, known as Broken Windows policing, emphasizes that
law enforcement should address quality-of-life violations—like
panhandling—to create an environment that makes felonies less
likely to occur.24 Maintaining a sense of order and focusing on
behavior that violates community social norms, the theory goes,
leads to safer neighborhoods. The Big Apple is not alone in
adopting quality-of-life policing strategies to curb panhandling.
Recently, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty
published a survey of 187 cities and found that 24% had
implemented citywide prohibitions on public begging, a 25%
increase since 2011.25 Similarly, 33% of the cities surveyed
banned all loitering in public, which represented a 35% increase
during the same time period.26
Reconciling quality-of-life policing with First Amendment
doctrine is the central aim of this note. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that soliciting for charitable purposes is protected
speech,27 it has yet to rule whether the act of begging—approaching
a stranger in public and requesting immediate and gratuitous cash
payment for oneself—is itself constitutionally protected speech.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee holds out the possibility that singling
out and regulating “solicitation and receipt of funds” is a
constitutional restriction on the means of speech, and not an
People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 233-34 (N.Y. 1992).
Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
23 People v. Hoffstead, 905 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (N.Y. App. Term 2010).
24 See generally Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1, at 29 (providing a framework
for reducing crime by addressing quality-of-life issues).
25 NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 7, 8, 20, http://www.nlchp.org/
documents/No_Safe_Place [http://perma.cc/7Q7N-YQZ8] (last visited May 17, 2016).
26 Id. at 21.
27 See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620,
632 (1980).
21

22
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unconstitutional burden on a speaker’s message, because banning
the immediate physical exchange of money regulates conduct and
not speech.28 To date, two circuits have adopted similar reasoning,29
but two others have explicitly rejected Kennedy’s argument and
held that the act of begging is itself part of the speaker’s message
and is subject to First Amendment protections.30
If the Supreme Court has the opportunity to resolve this
circuit split, it should accept Justice Kennedy’s reasoning. The
government has a legitimate interest in preserving the quality of
life in urban areas. Cities like New York have invested significant
resources to make their neighborhoods attractive to visitors and
residents and should be allowed to ensure that those areas do not
take on a carnival-like atmosphere. Even when the Court has
overturned regulations on charitable door-to-door solicitation, it
has recognized that the government has a “substantial” or
“important” interest in protecting citizens from “fraud, crime, and
undue annoyance.”31 Panhandling threatens these interests in
more pronounced ways than does door-to-door solicitation because
solicitees cannot retreat into the comfort of their own homes or
avoid panhandlers altogether by refusing to open their doors.32 To
effectively vindicate its interests, the government must be allowed
to separate the socially undesirable conduct (i.e., approaching an
individual with the intent to receive money) from the messages
that accompany it. Panhandlers still may communicate their
28 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 704-05
(1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
29 See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated,
135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (citing Justice Kennedy for the proposition that “a ban on direct
donations simply ‘limit[s] the manner of expression to forms other than immediate
receipt of money’” (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 704-05));
ISKCON of Potomac, Inc., 61 F.3d at 954-55 (citing Justice Kennedy’s Lee concurrence
and concluding that a ban on “solicitation,” defined as “includ[ing] only . . . in-person
request for immediate payment,” was a content-neutral restriction on the manner of
expression).
30 See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2015)
(overruling previous decision where it approvingly cited Justice Kennedy’s Lee
concurrence and finding that ban on solicitation for immediate donations is a contentbased speech restriction); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 876 (6th Cir. 2013)
(explicitly rejecting Justice Kennedy’s Lee concurrence and holding that solicitation
and receipt of payment cannot be separated for First Amendment purposes).
31 Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164-65 (2002) (conceding the
importance of the government’s claimed interests in preventing fraud and crime and
protecting a homeowner’s privacy).
32 The Court indicated in Village of Schaumburg that allowing homeowners
to opt out of unwanted solicitation by placing “No Solicitor” signs on their doors may
have been a constitutional means of carrying out the government’s substantial interest
in protecting individuals from the potential fraud and unwanted annoyance that could
accompany charitable solicitation. Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639.
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message (whatever it may be) if they are relegated to certain
zones or are permitted to hold signs asking individuals for money.
They simply should not be allowed to exert pressure, whether
subtle or overt, on the public by physically approaching people
and soliciting cash.
Part I of this note discusses the Broken Windows
approach to policing, which revolutionized how law enforcement
deals with quality-of-life issues, and analyzes how the theory
potentially conflicts with basic First Amendment principles. Part
II examines First Amendment doctrine, with an emphasis on the
distinctions between covered and protected speech in the context
of the Times Square panhandlers. Part III considers how several
circuits have addressed whether the First Amendment protects
panhandling. Part IV argues that prohibiting solicitation for the
immediate physical exchange of money is within the
government’s power because such regulations do not target a
speaker’s message. This note concludes that if antipanhandling
regulations are carefully drafted to leave alternatives for beggars
to express their message, such regulations could be valuable
methods for maintaining order in urban settings without violating
a speaker’s First Amendment rights.
I.

BROKEN WINDOWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Before analyzing whether panhandling is sufficiently
expressive to fall under the umbrella of the First Amendment’s
protection, it is helpful to place panhandling regulations in a
larger context. This part explains the Broken Windows policing
theory that justifies aggressively enforcing panhandling
regulations and examines how Broken Windows potentially
conflicts with the larger policy rationales behind protecting free
speech in the first place.
A.

The Broken Windows Theory of Policing

In 1982, George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson
published their seminal article on policing, “Broken Windows,”
in Atlantic Monthly.33 Citing studies that examined the sources
of public fear in urban communities, Kelling and Wilson found
that, in high-crime neighborhoods, the public fears general
community disorder as well as crime.34 Members of the
33
34

Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1, at 29.
Id. at 29-30.

2016]

PANHANDLING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1173

community express anxiety about not only violent people and
criminals, but also about “disreputable or obstreperous or
unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy
teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.”35 The
behavior that such people exhibit in public threatens to
undermine a community’s social fabric.
Kelling and Wilson argued that this social anxiety about
public disorder is justified and that “untended” deviant or
disreputable behavior leads to urban decay.36 They concluded
that, while disorder does not inevitably lead to higher crime rates,
“disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked.”37 This
connection is due to public perception about the state of a
particular neighborhood. To illustrate their point, Kelling and
Wilson used the analogy of the broken window. If someone breaks
a window and that window goes untended, it sends a message to
the community that nobody cares about the broken window, and
thus, more windows end up broken because there is no cost
associated with engaging in the deviant activity.38 Unchecked
issues like panhandling and public drunkenness are analogous to
the untended broken window. When panhandling goes
unaddressed, the community signals to the panhandler that his
disorderly and disreputable behavior will not be punished. And in
neighborhoods where disorder is rampant, people tend to believe
that crime is escalating, even if it is not.39 As a result, they alter
their behavior by using the streets less or avoiding others when
they do go out in public.40 This overarching sense of fear and lost
community creates a fertile breeding ground for crime. As Kelling
and Wilson put it, “Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic
or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught
or even identified if they operate on streets where potential
victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions.”41
Disorder creates the conditions that allow criminals to thrive.
To Kelling and Wilson, the way to prevent urban decay is
to restore order in the community.42 In communities where the
number of disreputable people is disproportionately small,
informal social controls may be an effective mechanism for
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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maintaining order.43 Kelling and Wilson concluded, however, that
in large urban communities, the order-maintenance function is
one that necessarily belongs to the police.44 They advocated for
policing that prioritizes placing officers on foot patrol to enforce
community norms and “return[s] to our long abandoned view that
police ought to protect communities as well as individuals.”45 This
view rejects efforts to “‘decriminalize’ disreputable behavior that
‘harms no one,’” because allowing even a single instance of
vagrancy or public drunkenness to go unchecked leads to a general
atmosphere of disorder or, to use the analogy, “a thousand broken
windows.”46 In short, by focusing on disorder and minor offenses,
police can create an environment that reduces major crimes.
Broken Windows theory heavily influenced law
enforcement’s evolution in the United States over the past 25
years. In the early 1990s, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYPD
Commissioner William Bratton carried out what is perhaps the
most famous example of Broken Windows policing. The city’s
experiment started in the subway system when, in April 1990,
Mayor David Dinkins named Bratton head of Transit Police.47 At
that time, disorder on the subways had led to the type of fear that
Kelling and Wilson described in their article.48 According to a
1985 Los Angeles Times article, New York experienced 14,000

Id. at 36.
Id. at 36-37.
45 Id. at 38.
46 Id. at 35.
47 WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP
COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 142 (1998).
48 Perhaps the event that most encapsulated this fear was the infamous
Bernhard Goetz incident. On December 22, 1984, Goetz shot four young black men while
riding the number 2 train in Manhattan. Max Kutner, 30 Years After Bernhard Goetz, A
Subway Shooting Evokes Comparison, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://
www.newsweek.com/30-years-after-bernhard-goetz-subway-shooting-evokes-comparisons313689 [http://perma.cc/F2LY-UKW5]. He claimed that one of the teenagers approached
him and told him, “Give me $5.” Id. According to Goetz, the look on the teenager’s face made
him fear for his life. Id. Following the shooting, many viewed Goetz as a vigilante hero who
stood up to criminals in a way that the city was unable to do. Id. He was ultimately
acquitted of the shooting on a theory of self-defense. Kirk Johnson, Goets is Cleared in
Subway Attack; Gun Count Upheld; Acquittal Won in Shooting of 4 Youths—Prison Term
Possible on Weapon Charge, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/
06/17/nyregion/goets-cleared-subway-attack-gun-count-upheld-acquittal-won-shooting4-youths.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/3J36-F25P]. Goetz unsuccessfully ran for
mayor in 2001, and in 2013, he was arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover police
officer. Michael Schwirtz, Bernard Goetz, Man in ‘84 Subway Shooting, Faces Marijuana
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/nyregion/bernardgoetz-man-in-84-subway-shooting-faces-marijuana-charges.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
25VY-L3ZF].
43
44
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felonies in the underground transit system in a single year.49
Robberies on the subway had increased by 48% in the two years
before Bratton took over, leading to mass exodus from the
system’s use.50 The situation was so dire that the Metropolitan
Transit Authority Chairman—the very man who was in charge of
running the city’s subway system—told the press that he would
not allow his son to ride the subway after dark due to his
“anxiety” about crime.51 Influenced by Broken Windows, Bratton
sought to alleviate this fear by cracking down on minor offenses,
like fare evading, that occurred in the transit system.52 Bratton’s
approach resulted in a 22% drop in overall felonies on the subway,
a 44% decrease in subway robberies, and a 50% decrease in fare
evasion.53 From 1990 through 1993, the drop in the transit
system’s overall crime rate outpaced crime reduction on the
streets—where quality-of-life policing was less forceful.54 The
effects that Broken Windows policing has had on the subway
system are still felt today. According to a recent Thompson
Reuters Foundation survey, interviewees ranked New York City’s
subway system among the safest in the world.55 While there were
17 major felonies on the subway per day in 1997, there were only
7 per day in 2013.56 This reduction came despite an almost two
million daily ridership increase in that same timespan.57
49 Charles J. Hanley, In Subway Crime, N.Y. Still Leads the World, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-17/news/mn-35322_1_subway-crime
[http://perma.cc/JHV7-75ND].
50 BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 47, at 143.
51 Ravitch Keeps His Son Off Subways at Night, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/21/nyregion/ravitch-keeps-his-son-off-subways-at-night.
html [http://perma.cc/A58N-XWVS].
52 BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 47, at 152; see also Jeffrey Bellin, The
Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City
“Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1503-04 (2014) (“Bratton had garnered
attention as NYC Transit Police Commissioner by embracing the increasingly popular
Broken Windows theory of policing: pouring resources into arresting minor offenders,
like subway fare evaders, in the hope that a decrease in low-level ‘disorder’ would lead
to fewer serious crimes.”).
53 BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 47, at 180.
54 WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, BROKEN WINDOWS AND QUALITY-OFLIFE POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/
pdf/analysis_and_planning/qol.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5US-JQQH] (showing a 35.9% decrease
in crime rates in the subway system but a 17.9% decrease in the rest of the city).
55 Lisa Anderson, EXCLUSIVE-POLL: New York City Transport Seen as
Safest in World for Women, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://www.trust.org/item/20141029000109-g20eo [http://perma.cc/MXC2-8LGM].
56 Sarah Ryley & Pete Donohue, EXCLUSIVE: Safest and Riskiest Areas of New
York’s Subway System Revealed in Daily News Investigation, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 22,
2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/daily-news-analysis-rev
eals-crime-rankings-city-subway-system-article-1.1836918 [http://perma.cc/6E9X-LAKA].
57 More Than 6 Million Customers Ride Subway on Five Separate Days in
September, METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.mta.info/news-subway-
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After he was elected Mayor of New York City in 1993,
Rudy Giuliani selected Bratton as Police Commissioner of the
NYPD because Giuliani believed in Broken Windows policing and
was impressed by Bratton’s success with the approach under
Mayor Dinkins.58 Giuliani and Bratton focused law enforcement
efforts on quality-of-life issues, famously singling out “squeegee
men”—panhandlers who would approach stopped motorists,
“clean” their windows, and demand donations for these
“services.”59 Bratton also placed officers on “beer and piss patrol,”
where they would look out for those who committed minor
offenses (e.g., open container and public urination violations) so
that police could stop the perpetrators and check them for
identification.60 During these stops, police would run the IDs for
outstanding warrants and frisk the detainees for weapons.61
Police discovered that, in many instances, individuals who
committed minor violations were also wanted for other crimes.62
As a result of these tactics, the city experienced a 70%
increase in misdemeanor arrests during the 1990s.63 A decrease in
crime rates in New York City accompanied this more aggressive
policing. Between 1990 and 2015, homicides fell from 2,245 to
350, and the NYPD has reported that the rates of other crimes
have diminished as well.64 Interestingly, unlike other cities that
experienced reductions in crime rates during this time period,
New York City experienced a reduction in incarceration rates
simultaneously with the decrease in crime.65 That is because
Broken Windows is a proactive theory of policing—emphasizing
informal implementation of community norms and crime
prevention—rather than a reactive theory of law enforcement
that promotes the initiation of formal legal proceedings after

new-york-city-transit-ridership-record-breaking/2014/10/22/more-6-million-customersride [http://perma.cc/CU4N-XZCZ] (showing 4,132,332 riders on the peak ridership day
in 1997 and 5,987,595 riders on the peak day in 2013).
58 Eric Pooley & Elaine Rivera, One Good Apple, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54.
59 George L. Kelling, Why Did People Stop Committing Crimes? An Essay
About Criminology and Ideology, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 571 & n.10 (2000).
60 Pooley & Rivera, supra note 58.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 David R. Francis, What Reduced Crime in New York City, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/digest/jan03/w9061.html [http://perma.cc/K52WMS6Z] (last visited May 17, 2016).
64 See Bellin, supra note 52, at 1520-21; Pervaiz Shallwani & Mark Morales,
NYC Officials Tout New Low in Crime, but Homicide, Rape, Robbery Rose, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 4, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nyc-officials-tout-new-low-incrime-but-homicide-rape-robbery-rose-1451959203 [http://perma.cc/959T-3ZRM].
65 See Bellin, supra note 52, at 1529.
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crime occurs.66 As a result, police prevent crime before it happens
through active quality-of-life enforcement instead of spending
resources investigating crime after the fact.
The City Council’s recent bill ordering panhandlers to
operate in certain zones is a perfect example of legislation that is
driven by the premise underlying Broken Windows policing: that
law enforcement has a responsibility to enforce community norms
and deter disorderly or disreputable behavior. Law enforcement is
so concerned with Spider-Man and the desnudas because allowing
deviant behavior to go unaddressed will result in that behavior’s
proliferation. The panhandlers’ expansion from Times Square to
other areas of the city, and their increasingly aggressive behavior,
serve as anecdotal evidence that the theory may in fact be reality.
While some scholarship has challenged the premises
underlying Broken Windows and its effectiveness as a crime
reduction strategy,67 it undoubtedly remains an influential theory
in the policing world. Despite running on a progressive platform
in which he criticized the NYPD’s “Stop and Frisk” program,
Mayor de Blasio chose Bratton to serve as his police commissioner
and has publicly affirmed the city’s commitment to enforcing
laws, like prohibitions on subway dancing and panhandling, that
are designed to preserve a high quality of life.68 Looking at Broken
Windows theory’s influence on community policing strategies
See Bellin, supra note 52, at 1530-31.
See, e.g., STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 136-44
(2005) (suggesting that legalized abortion may have played a larger role than policing
strategies in reducing crime during the 1990s); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken
Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 271, 276-77 (2006) (arguing that reduction in crime in New York City’s high-crime
neighborhoods during the 1990s was a “mean reversion” following the end of the city’s crack
epidemic and that moving people from disorderly to affluent neighborhoods does not reduce
their criminal behavior according to a multicity study); Ana Joanes, Note, Does the New
York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New York City’s Homicide
Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L.
& SOCIAL PROBS. 265, 267 (2000) (arguing that crime is cyclical and using three index
measures to show that crime in New York during the 1990s did not fall at a greater rate
than other cities that employed different policing strategies). But see MALCOLM GLADWELL,
THE TIPPING POINT 140-51 (2000) (arguing that Broken Windows contributed to an
environmental change in New York City that played an important role in reversing the
city’s crime epidemic); GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., MANHATTAN
INSTITUTE, DO POLICE MATTER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE
REFORMS 8-9 (2001), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf [http://perma.cc/
P8S9-AX3D] (running statistical regression analyses and concluding that “‘broken-windows’
policing, as reflected by arrests for misdemeanor offenses, has exerted the most significant
influence on trends in violent crime” when compared to changes in the economy, reductions
in the crack trade, or demographics).
68 Christopher Robbins, De Blasio: Broken Windows Policing Is Here to Stay,
GOTHAMIST (July 28, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://gothamist.com/2014/07/28/de_blasio_
broken_windows_policing_i.php [http://perma.cc/ZG7T-U636].
66

67
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helps explain the government’s visceral reaction to the Times
Square panhandlers; it perceives them as threatening the city’s
quality of life. The government’s responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, however, limits the steps it may take to curb
panhandling activity. The next section addresses concerns that
Broken Windows theory’s emphasis on preventive policing and
maintaining order may conflict with liberty interests protected by
the First Amendment.
B.

The Apparent Conflict Between Broken Windows and the
First Amendment

The conception of police as guardians of order and
enforcers of community norms can potentially conflict with
constitutional notions of individual liberty and equal protection.
Kelling and Wilson themselves recognized this potential,
particularly in the context of how police interact with citizens
from minority groups.69 After all, the majority tends to define
community norms, so there is a risk that culturally marginalized
groups will disproportionately become targets of law enforcement.
Kelling and Wilson hoped that such consequences could be
avoided through a meticulous officer selection process and quality
police training.70 The concern that proactive policing could single
out racial minorities underscored U.S. District Court Judge Shira
Scheindlin’s opinion in Floyd v. City of New York, where she ruled
that the NYPD “Stop and Frisk” policy violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.71 Judge Scheindlin emphasized that we
as a society care not only about effectively reducing crime but also
about protecting individual liberty. She wrote that “[m]any police
practices may be useful for fighting crime—preventive detention
or coerced confessions, for example—but because they are
unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter how effective.”72
Judge Scheindlin recognized that the most effective crime
reduction techniques could possibly threaten citizens’ liberties.

69 Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1, at 35 (“The concern about equity is more
serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes one person more undesirable
than another but how do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or
harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable
from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become the
agents of neighborhood bigotry? We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this
important question.”).
70 Id.
71 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
72 Id. at 556.
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One of those liberties is the freedom of speech, enshrined
in the First Amendment.73 There are several theories upon which
free speech protections are justified. First, in a democratic
republic like the United States, the free exchange of ideas is
necessary to preserve self-governance.74 Second, open competition
in a marketplace of ideas is the best crucible for determining the
truth.75 Third, exposure to ideas that we disagree with teaches us
to tolerate others when we are confronted with beliefs that we
find undesirable.76 Finally, free expression is an essential aspect
of individual autonomy and the development of the human
character.77 These rationales behind the First Amendment all
support the proposition that public outrage at a speaker’s
message does not justify abridging that individual’s right to speak
his mind. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[A] principal
‘function of free speech [in our] . . . government is to invite
dispute.’”78 That is why regulations of speech that target a
speaker’s message are presumptively unconstitutional.79
Some of the principles underlying the Free Speech Clause
may conflict with Broken Windows policing, which places a
premium on order maintenance as a means of effectively reducing
crime, usually at the expense of unpopular behavior (e.g., public
drunkenness, panhandling, urinating on the street). It is possible
to see how some of this unpopular behavior might also be
minimally expressive. To use an example other than panhandling
(which will be explored in more detail in Parts II and III),
consider public urination. An individual may choose to relieve
himself on a municipal building, for example, to protest against a
certain government policy.80 The individual in this case would
seek to express his distaste for the government through his
73 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
74 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES
850 (4th ed. 2012).
75 Id.; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he theory of our Constitution [is] . . . that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
76 MASSEY, supra note 74, at 851.
77 Id.
78 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (quoting Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
79 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
80 Professor Mark Tushnet uses ticket scalping as another example. While the
justifications for prohibiting ticket scalping are about economics rather than preserving
quality of life, it is possible to view the activity as minimally expressive. See Mark Tushnet,
Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 174 n.16 (2012). As Tushnet
explains, a libertarian may scalp tickets “as a way [to] subvert[ ] the regulatory state,”
thereby expressing opposition to perceived government overreach. See id. at 191.
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actions, although most people would undoubtedly find the way he
chose to do so repugnant. This is where the policy goals of Broken
Windows policing and First Amendment theory conflict. As
mentioned in Section I.A, Broken Windows theory is premised on
the idea that police should proactively address the public’s fear of
disorder by informally reinforcing community norms against
those who exhibit disreputable conduct.81 This “view that the police
ought to protect communities as well as individuals”82 contrasts
with the belief that individual citizens should have the right to
freely express themselves, even if doing so makes the public feel
uncomfortable. Tension arises when a community perceives a
means of free expression as a threat to its quality of life.
The concern that proactive policing may conflict with the
exercise of First Amendment rights is not a purely hypothetical
one. In 2005, for instance, the New York Civil Liberties Union
(NYCLU) released a report evaluating the way that the NYPD
handled protests outside the Republican National Convention.83
In that document, the NYCLU criticized the NYPD’s “command
and control” model for handling the demonstrations.84 This
approach, which the NYCLU claimed stemmed from a Broken
Windows policing strategy, utilized techniques such as police
barricades and the exercise of force against demonstrators for
trivial legal violations.85 Demonstrators sued New York City for
violating their First Amendment rights by carrying out mass
arrests during the rally and unreasonably detaining protesters.86
The city ultimately settled the lawsuits for $18 million.87
The conflict between the goals of maintaining public order
and protecting the right to self-expression is obvious in the
context of political protests. After all, the protection of political

Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1, at 38.
Id.
83 See generally CHRISTOPHER DUNN ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RIGHTS
AND WRONGS AT THE RNC (2005), http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/rnc_report_083005.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V2U2-YLPR] (issuing a report criticizing the NYPD’s handling of protests
at the 2004 Republican National Convention).
84 Id. at 11.
85 Id.
86 Complaint at 29, Schiller v. City of New York, No. 1:04-cv-07922-RJS-JCF
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004), 2004 WL 5364646; First Amended Complaint at 21, Dinler v.
City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 07921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005).
87 Erin Durkin & Daniel Beekman, City Pays $18 Million to Settle Lawsuits
Stemming from 2004 Republican National Convention at Madison Square Garden, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:50 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/citypays-18m-settle-rnc-lawsuits-article-1.1581416 [http://perma.cc/FPP3-RW95].
81

82
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speech is central to the First Amendment.88 The importance of
that speech requires the government to narrowly tailor any
restrictions of political speech to further a compelling government
interest.89 Whether regulations of begging or panhandling
implicate the First Amendment is less clear. Part II of this note
explores First Amendment doctrine to consider whether
panhandling is sufficiently expressive to receive protection. Here,
however, it is easy to see the different values that Broken
Windows policing (protecting communities from the negative
effects of disorder) and the First Amendment (protecting
individual freedom of expression) represent. Understanding these
sometimes conflicting values is critical to determining just how
far the government can go in regulating panhandling activity in
Times Square without running roughshod over the Constitution.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

A.

Is Panhandling Covered by the First Amendment?
1. Basic Doctrine

For the First Amendment to protect panhandling, it
must cover panhandling to begin with. Questions of protection
and coverage are not one and the same,90 and if the First
Amendment does not cover a particular activity, that activity is
categorically not afforded protection.91 Even an activity that the
First Amendment covers, however, may not be protected if the
government’s regulation satisfies the appropriate doctrinal
test.92 The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause only covers
a particular category of activity, “speech.”93 Therefore, for a
88 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of
course, is ‘at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003))).
89 See Citizens United v. FEC 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that burden
political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove
that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.’” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 451 (2007))).
90 See Tushnet, supra note 80, at 174-75.
91 See id. at 175 (“First Amendment analysis is simply irrelevant to activities
not covered by the First Amendment.”).
92 See id. For example, if activity is covered by the First Amendment, a court will
look at whether the government’s regulation is content neutral or content based. Id.
93 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see also Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267-68
(1981) (“Not every case is a first amendment case. This is hardly a controversial observation,
but it reveals that the first amendment is itself a category, or, more accurately, that it
covers a category of behavior. . . . [W]e can begin by saying that, in an important way, it is
the category of ‘speech’ that is set off by the first amendment for special protection.”).
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panhandling regulation to implicate free speech doctrine,
panhandling must constitute speech.
While all conduct arguably contains some expressive
elements (take the public urination hypothetical in Section I.B,
for example), minimally expressive conduct is not considered
speech for First Amendment purposes.94 The Court has held,
however, that certain conduct has “sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play.”95 In
determining whether conduct falls within the scope of the First
Amendment’s free speech protections, the prevailing test is
“whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.’”96 Flag burning is
the quintessential example of expressive conduct. The Supreme
Court has held that burning the American flag in protest is
politically expressive activity that is sufficiently communicative to
justify First Amendment coverage.97 There is no question that
someone who lights a flag on fire during a political rally intends to
express displeasure with the government, and everyone who
witnesses the act will understand the flag burner’s message. On
the other hand, the First Amendment would probably not cover
public urination. Even if someone urinates on a building in protest,
a reasonable person would not likely understand the message that
the urinating individual intends to convey. A law that is designed
to maintain public order by prohibiting public urination would
therefore be consistent with the First Amendment.
There are other expressive activities that the First
Amendment categorically does not cover, even some that involve
the spoken word. The Court has identified “well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”98 Types of speech that are categorically
denied First Amendment protection include obscenity,99 child
94 See, e.g., Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example,
walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel
is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”).
95 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
96 Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
97 Id. at 406; see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 n.4 (1990)
(describing flag burning in protest as “concededly political speech”).
98 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
99 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”).
Material is obscene when (1) a trier of fact finds that “‘the average person, applying
contemporary community standards [as opposed to national standards]’ would find that the
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pornography,100 true threats,101 incitement,102 and “fighting
words.”103 The Supreme Court has declined to add new categories
to this narrow class in recent years.104 If panhandling is
sufficiently expressive to bring the First Amendment into play,
the amendment will likely cover it.
Panhandling, which often involves the spoken word, seems
to fit somewhere between flag burning and public urination on
the scale of expressive conduct. The panhandler is, after all,
expressing something—a desire to receive money—but the reason
for engaging in the conduct may not be reasonably apparent. The
Supreme Court has never ruled on whether panhandling is
sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection.105
The Court has found on several occasions, however, that the First
Amendment protects charitable organizations’ right to solicit
alms.106 The Court in Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) “the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law”;
and (3) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.” Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972); A Book Named “John
Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)).
Material appeals to the prurient interest when it has “a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
100 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that “the category of
child pornography . . . like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment”). Child
pornography is “limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a
[certain] age” and is categorically unprotected even if the depiction is not legally obscene. Id.
101 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (including “[t]rue threats” in
the classes of speech that are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment and
defining true threats as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals”).
102 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment “do[es] not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action”).
103 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (holding that “‘fighting’ words” fall in the narrow
class of speech not afforded First Amendment protection). Fighting words are defined as
those that a reasonable listener would take “as a direct personal insult or an invitation to
exchange fisticuffs.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989). Fighting words are thus
distinguished from incitement because they instinctually cause a listener to inflict violence
on the speaker. Incitement is different because it occurs when the speaker addresses a
crowd, rather than another individual face-to-face, and causes the crowd to engage in
imminent lawless action or commit violence against others. Burton Caine, The Trouble with
“Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values
and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 450-52 (2004).
104 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (holding that
violent “video games qualify for First Amendment protection”); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (refusing to add “depictions of animal cruelty” to the
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment).
105 Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2013).
106 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 789
(1988); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959-60 (1984);
Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
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Environment held that charitable door-to-door solicitation falls
within the scope of the First Amendment because it “involve[s] a
variety of speech interests” such as “communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and
ideas, and the advocacy of causes.”107 When seeking charitable
contributions, canvassers who receive a salary from charitable
organizations “are necessarily more than solicitors for money”
because their activity is “characteristically intertwined” with
speech advocating for different political or religious views.108
That soliciting contributions for charitable purposes is
protected speech does not necessarily mean that the act of
actually receiving money at the time of solicitation is protected
speech. There is some disagreement on this point among courts.
In Bery v. New York, the Second Circuit considered a challenge to
New York City’s general vendors license.109 A group of artists
challenged the licensing requirement, arguing that conditioning
their ability to sell their wares upon obtaining a license violated
the First Amendment.110 The City argued that peddling art is not
conduct that implicates the First Amendment because it is not
“inseparably intertwined with a ‘particularized message.’”111 The
Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the selling of a vendor’s
own artwork conveyed the artist’s belief that the general public,
and not only the rich, should have the opportunity to view and
purchase art.112 A struggling artist’s ability to express this
message would be lost if he did not have the chance to sell his
work.113 Like in Schaumburg, the expression and receipt of money
were inextricable in this case.
In State v. Chepilko, a New Jersey state court arrived at
the opposite conclusion.114 Chepilko was punished under an
ordinance that made it illegal to sell merchandise on the Atlantic
City boardwalk after he took pictures of tourists and sold the
photographs to them.115 The court rejected his First Amendment
claim because Chepilko’s primary purpose in selling the pictures
was not artistic expression.116 Rather, his predominant intent was
See, e.g., Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
Id.
109 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
110 Id. at 691.
111 Id. at 695 (quoting Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153
(2d Cir. 1990)).
112 Id. at 696.
113 Id.
114 State v. Chepilko, 965 A.2d 190, 192 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 200.
107

108
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to make money.117 Because he was not “‘genuinely and primarily
engaged in artistic self-expression’ but ‘instead a chiefly
commercial exercise,’” his conduct did not bring the First
Amendment into play.118 In this case, Chepilko asking for money
was not expressive conduct.
The Times Square panhandlers are more akin to Chepilko
than the artists in Bery who sought to sell their wares. There are
some news stories that reveal the panhandlers’ true intent: they
want to make money. In an interview with the New York Times,
Mey Ovalles, one of the desnudas, explained why she began
walking bare-breasted in Times Square. After working at a
restaurant in Miami, she discovered that she could make more
money as a desnuda.119 She moved to New York and earns about
$300 a day in tips by taking photographs with tourists.120 Ovalles
considers her activity “like any other job in another place.”121
Times Square’s Naked Cowboy is even more successful. Thanks to
some clever branding (he has trademarked the name “Naked
Cowboy”)122 and advice from a financial advisor,123 he makes
$150,000 a year.124 A sign that one 36-year-old Times Square
panhandler from Arkansas displays sums up the sentiment quite
succinctly: “F—k You!!! Pay Me!!!!!!!.”125
Dressing in a costume or walking bare-breasted in Times
Square may be a form of artistic expression that is entitled to
First Amendment protection if it falls in the category of
“performing art.”126 Unlike charitable solicitation, however, it is
Id.
Id. (quoting Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2006)).
119 Wright, supra note 7.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Naked Cowboy v. CBS, 844 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Naked
Cowboy has contracted with a number of corporate sponsors and has used his brand to sell
“T-Shirts, Postcards, Keychains, Shot Glasses, Music CDs, Pencils, Photos, and more.” Id.
Apparently, “[a]ccording to the New York State tourism department [the Naked Cowboy] is
‘more recognizable than the Statue of Liberty.’” Id. (quoting Complaint at ex. B, Naked
Cowboy v. CBS, 844 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
123 The Naked Cowboy Flaunts His Assets, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 20, 2008, 12:45 PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2008/02/the_naked_cowboy_flaunts_his_a.html# [http://
perma.cc/F2LR-LSJ6].
124 Cowles, supra note 8.
125 Bruce Golding et al., ‘F—k You! Pay Me!’: Times Square’s New Welcome
Wagon, N.Y. POST (July 9, 2015, 2:04 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/07/09/this-vulgarpanhandler-is-times-squares-new-welcome-wagon/ [http://perma.cc/FP56-Y345].
126 Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1036 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Music
and performance art are forms of expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment.” (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)
(“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as
musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”))).
117
118
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possible to separate that expression from the commercial activity
a person undertakes when he or she asks for and receives money
for personal use. Narrowly defining panhandling as “solicitation
and the immediate receipt of money” can eliminate any First
Amendment problems by removing the conduct from First
Amendment coverage. While the Supreme Court has not resolved
the question of whether panhandling is a form of expressive
conduct that can be separated from the subsequent receipt of
cash, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee is informative.127
2. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
In Krishna Consciousness, the Court upheld a Port
Authority prohibition on solicitation at an airport terminal.128
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, applied a
reasonableness standard in analyzing the prohibition’s
constitutionality, finding that airports are not public forums.129
The Court held that such a prohibition is reasonable because
solicitation can disrupt business by altering the flow of traffic in
the airport, and solicitors can take advantage of vulnerable
travelers by means of fraud and duress.130
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. He disagreed
with the Court’s characterization that an airport terminal does
not constitute a public forum.131 He wrote, however, that a “ban on
solicitation and receipt of funds” is either a “valid regulation of
the time, place, and manner of protected speech in this forum, or
else is a valid regulation of the nonspeech element of expressive
conduct.”132 Kennedy agreed with the proposition that solicitation
is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment.133 If the
ban targeted all solicitation, he would have struck it down.134 But
the regulation in Krishna Consciousness was narrower than that.
It merely banned “solicitation and receipt of funds.”135 This
prohibition was aimed at conduct, specifically, the “physical
exchange of money.”136 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that “the
127 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 684-85.
129 Id. at 683.
130 Id. at 683-84.
131 Id. at 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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regulation permit[ted] expression that solicits funds, but limit[ed]
the manner of that expression to forms other than the immediate
receipt of money.”137 Because in-person solicitation for an
immediate exchange of cash heightens the risk that a solicited
person would become the victim of fraud or duress, Justice
Kennedy decided that the ban did not target a speaker’s message
and was narrowly tailored to effectuate the government’s interest
in avoiding the dangers of panhandling.138
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Krishna Consciousness
can be parsed in one of two ways. On the one hand, it stands for
the proposition that the First Amendment does not cover
panhandling—defined as solicitation for the immediate physical
exchange of money—at all. Regulations that prohibit the physical
exchange of cash do not target any particularized message. They
target conduct. People ask for money for a variety of reasons.
Some may seek the immediate receipt of funds for charitable
purposes, while others may seek it to fund a political campaign.
In either case, the physical exchange of money is not in any way
inextricably linked to the message the “speaker” seeks to convey
(either support for a charity or endorsement of a political
candidate). Panhandling differs from something like burning a
flag during a political demonstration, an act that falls within the
scope of the First Amendment, in this regard. Unlike
panhandling, the message associated with flag burning is
immediately apparent to those who witness it.139
Another way to read Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is
that the First Amendment covers panhandling, but that
panhandling is unprotected in the context of the Port Authority’s
regulation. The Port Authority’s ban fit one of the doctrinal tests
to determine that speech is unprotected; it was a content-neutral
time, place, and manner restriction of covered speech (i.e.,
solicitation) or else was an incidental limitation on expressive
conduct. In fact, that is how Kennedy actually described the ban,
stating that it would satisfy either test and that both tests are
almost indistinguishable doctrinally.140
The Second Circuit articulated both views of panhandling
two years earlier in Young v. New York City Transit Authority,
Id.
Id. at 706-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (holding that while not all
action taken with respect to the American flag is expressive, the “expressive, overtly
political nature of [burning the flag in demonstration] was both intentional and
overwhelmingly apparent”).
140 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137
138
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when it upheld a ban on begging in New York City’s subway
system.141 In Young, the court framed the primary question as
“whether begging constitutes the kind of ‘expressive conduct’
protected to some extent by the First Amendment.”142 The court
held that the conduct was not protected, finding that “begging is
not inseparably intertwined with a ‘particularized message’”143
and that “[s]peech simply is not inherent to the act” of begging.144
It distinguished begging from charitable solicitation, finding that
“[w]hile organized charities serve community interests by
enhancing communication and disseminating ideas, the conduct
of begging and panhandling in the subway amounts to nothing
less than a menace to the common good.”145 Under this approach,
panhandling is not even speech for First Amendment purposes
and is categorically excluded from coverage.
In the alternative, the Young court also found that, even
assuming that begging has some communicative element (and thus
warrants First Amendment coverage), prohibiting begging on the
subway satisfies the test for regulating expressive conduct.146 This
test, and other doctrinal tests, such as those distinguishing
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech,
determine when covered activity is protected by the First
Amendment and are explored in the next section.
B.

To What Extent, If Any, Is Panhandling Protected?
1. Content-Neutral vs. Content-Based Regulations

If panhandling is speech that the First Amendment
covers, how may the government regulate it? There are two basic
types of speech regulations: content-based and content-neutral
restrictions. Content-based regulations target speech because of
the speaker’s message and are presumptively unconstitutional.147
These regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, which means that
they must be the least restrictive means of accomplishing a
compelling government interest.148 Conversely, a content-neutral
regulation is one that is “justified without reference to the content

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 161; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
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of the regulated speech.”149 These regulations do not target a
speaker’s message, but rather affect the “time, place, or manner”
in which the speaker attempts to deliver that message.150
Content-neutral speech restrictions that occur in public forums
must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest[ ] and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for the
communication of the information.”151 A regulation prescribing the
decibel level at which a musician may perform in a public park
would be a content-neutral regulation because it is aimed at the
performance volume and not the music’s content.152 If the
government targeted only rap music in its volume regulation,
however, the regulation would be content-based because it targets
a specific type of music.153
The Supreme Court’s most recent explication of the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations
came in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.154 The Reed petitioners challenged
a municipality’s ordinance that regulated the size and display
period for different types of signs.155 The ordinance prohibited
outdoor sign displays anywhere in the city, but it exempted 23
sign categories.156 Petitioners challenged the regulation, arguing
that the ordinance’s differential treatment of their signs, which
directed people to church gatherings, from other types of signs—
like “political” or “ideological” signs—constituted an invalid
content-based speech regulation.157
The Court struck down the ordinance as facially content
based.158 In doing so, it rebuffed several of the government’s
assertions that the regulation was content neutral. First, the
Court rejected the contention that a facially content-based law
could be content neutral so long as the government did not enact
the law because it disagreed with the speaker’s message.159 The
desire to single out a particular message for disfavored treatment
is a sufficient but not necessary condition to show that a
149 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
150 Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
151 Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
152 Id. at 803.
153 In Ward, the Court held that music is speech protected by the First
Amendment. Id. at 790. As a result, distinguishing between types of music in this
situation would be presumptively invalid.
154 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
155 Id. at 2224-25.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 2224-26.
158 Id. at 2227.
159 Id. at 2228.
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regulation is content based.160 A court must inquire into the facial
neutrality of the restriction prior to examining the government’s
purpose in enacting it.161 Second, the Court ruled that even if a
speech restriction does not discriminate based on viewpoint, it is
still content based if it singles out an entire subject for differential
treatment.162 A law banning political speech, for example, would
still be content based even if it applies to both conservative and
liberal viewpoints. Lastly, the court rejected the proposition that
because an ordinance is speaker- or event-based, the law is
content neutral.163 Because the sign ordinance was not the least
restrictive means of achieving the government’s purported
interest in preventing eyesores or ensuring traffic safety, the
Court found that it was unconstitutional.164 The Court thus
clarified the following rule for determining whether a regulation
is content based: “regulation of speech is content based if a law
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the
idea or message expressed.”165
While the circumstances in Reed made it easy to
determine that the ordinance was content based, the line between
content-based and content-neutral regulations is not always so
well-defined. The Court’s line of cases regarding statutes
restricting speech outside abortion clinics makes this abundantly
clear.166 Most recently, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Supreme
Court unanimously struck down a law that established a buffer
zone prohibiting an individual from “knowingly stand[ing] on a
‘public way or sidewalk’ within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway”
to an abortion clinic.167 The Court divided, however, over whether
a buffer zone outside an abortion clinic constituted a facially
content-based restriction on speech or a content-neutral time,
place, or manner restriction.168 Those challenging the buffer zone
argued that it was facially content based for two reasons: (1) the
Id.
Id.
162 Id. at 2230.
163 Id. at 2230-31.
164 Id. at 2231-32.
165 Id. at 2227.
166 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (finding a buffer
zone outside an abortion clinic to be a content-neutral speech restriction); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (upholding a buffer zone outside abortion clinics as
a content-neutral speech regulation); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 762-63 (1994) (holding that an injunction restricting only the speech of antiabortion protesters was not content based).
167 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2522, 2525, 2541 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
266, § 120E1/2(a), (b)).
168 See id. at 2531; id. at 2543 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160
161
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buffer zone only applied outside abortion clinics, thus
discriminating against speech about abortion, and (2) it
selectively exempted abortion clinic employees from the buffer
zone, thus not only discriminating based on topic but also favoring
a particular viewpoint.169
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that
the buffer zone was facially content neutral, even though it
disproportionately affected speech about abortion.170 A law is
facially content based, the Court wrote, “if it require[s]
‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the message
that is conveyed to determine whether’ a violation has
occurred.”171 The incidentally disproportionate impact on speech
about a particular subject did not render the statute content
based, because a violation depended not on what a speaker said,
but on where he stood.172 The majority also held that the selective
exemption for abortion clinic employees did not make the statute
content based. It only existed to allow employees, including
counselors and maintenance workers, to do their jobs and was not
designed to promote pro-abortion speech.173 The Court found
nothing in the record indicating that the abortion clinics
authorized employees to speak about abortion in the buffer zone,
but it suggested that if such authorization were given, it could
support an as-applied challenge for viewpoint discrimination.174
Justice Scalia, in a blistering dissent-like concurrence,
argued that the buffer zone was facially content based. Unlike the
majority, he concluded that the statute’s targeting only abortion
clinics was strong evidence that the government sought to single
out speech about a particular subject—abortion—for disfavored
treatment.175 He also insisted that an exemption for abortion
clinic employees acting within the scope of their employment
rendered the restriction facially content based.176 Someone who
works for an abortion clinic presumably supports abortion, and
the exemption therefore favored that viewpoint over the
viewpoint of silenced pro-life advocates, wrote Justice Scalia.177 In
essence, the key disagreement between the plurality and the

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 2530.
Id. at 2531.
Id. (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Calif., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).
Id.
Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2534.
Id. at 2544-45 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2546 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.

1192

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:3

concurrence was about how a court should determine whether a
regulation is facially content based.
Reed and McCullen directly conflict, particularly when it
comes to how the majority in McCullen scrutinized the buffer
zone’s selective exemption provision. As Justice Scalia mentioned
in his concurrence, the majority “jump[ed] right over the prong
that asks whether the provision ‘draw[s] . . . distinctions on its
face’ and instead proceed[ed] directly to the purpose-related
prong.”178 But Reed counseled that a court should consider facial
distinctions before considering a regulation’s purpose.179 Also,
Reed’s holding that defining speech by topic will subject a
regulation to strict scrutiny is an oversimplification of the Court’s
First Amendment doctrine. The Court has held, for instance, that
commercial speech, “that is, expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience,”180 is entitled
to less protection than other types of speech.181 By making the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, the
Court has found it permissible for the government to discriminate
between subject matter, at least regarding certain topics. Reed’s
holding that regulations treating speech differently based on topic
are content based should not be understood to prevent the
government from treating solicitation for immediate cash
payment differently from other types of solicitation. The exchange
of money is not itself communicative enough to allow a reasonable
observer to understand the message the “speaker” is trying to
convey. As a result, it is possible to separate the physical
exchange of cash from the panhandler’s message and regulate
panhandling to serve the public’s interest in preserving a decent
quality of life.
2. Regulation of Expressive Conduct
Courts use a different doctrinal test to determine whether
speech is protected when expressive and nonexpressive
components are part of the same course of conduct. As with
flag burning, there are some instances where the First
Amendment covers expressive conduct. If communicative and
Id. (quoting McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531, 2533).
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
180 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
181 Id. at 562 (“[O]ur decisions have recognized ‘the “common-sense”
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.’”
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978))).
178

179
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noncommunicative components combine to form the same act,
then “regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”182 The Supreme Court
articulated the standard for regulating expressive conduct in
United States v. O’Brien. According to the O’Brien test, the
government may regulate sufficiently expressive conduct when (1)
the regulation “is within the constitutional power of the
Government,” (2) “it furthers an important or substantial
government interest,” (3) that “governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression,” and (4) “the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”183 In O’Brien,
the Court upheld the conviction of a protester who burned his
selective service certificate to demonstrate his opposition to the
Vietnam War.184 By engaging in such conduct, O’Brien violated a
federal statute that made it unlawful to knowingly destroy or
mutilate a selective service certificate.185 The Court held that the
law was a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional power to
raise armies, that it substantially furthered the proper
functioning of the system Congress established to carry out that
power, and that there were no narrower means the legislature
could have chosen to ensure availability of the selective service
certificates.186 The statute was thus a justified incidental
limitation on speech.
Functionally, the O’Brien test is similar to the traditional
test for determining the validity of content-neutral regulations.
Justice Kennedy, in his Krishna Consciousness concurrence,
observed that similarity when he wrote “that the standards for
assessing time, place, and manner restrictions are little, if any,
different from the standards applicable to regulations of conduct
with an expressive component.”187 Thus, if panhandling is
considered sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment
protection, any regulation of panhandling that singles out a
speaker’s message will be presumptively invalid. Alternatively,
any incidental limitation of expression must be narrowly tailored
to carry out a government interest and must leave open
alternative channels of communication. Rather than viewing the
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
Id. at 377.
184 Id. at 370-72.
185 Id. at 370.
186 Id. at 381.
187 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 704 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
182

183
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First Amendment as categorically leaving panhandling
uncovered, several circuits have adopted this interpretation of
Justice Kennedy’s Krishna Consciousness concurrence.188 As the
next part will show, however, there is a circuit split regarding
whether prohibiting solicitation and receipt of funds is a contentbased or content-neutral regulation of speech.
III

CIRCUIT RESPONSES TO JUSTICE KENNEDY’S KRISHNA
CONSCIOUSNESS CONCURRENCE

The Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether
the First Amendment protects panhandling in a public forum.189
The circuits, however, are split on the issue. There are four circuit
cases in which the courts have confronted Justice Kennedy’s
reasoning. This part describes those cases and explains how the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Reed has thrown this area of
law into disarray.
A.

Circuits Adopting Justice Kennedy’s Reasoning

Two circuits have explicitly accepted the reasoning in
Justice Kennedy’s Krishna Consciousness concurrence. In
ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, the D.C. Circuit considered
an as-applied challenge to a National Parks Department
regulation that prohibited in-person solicitation of donations as
well as sales of certain merchandise at the National Mall.190
ISKCON received a permit to host an event on a 100-square-foot
allotment of the park.191 The Parks Department revoked the
permit after ISKCON violated the solicitation and sales bans.192
188 See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2014) (concluding
that the assumption that a “ban on immediate donations is a content
distinction . . . finds scant support in the case law”); ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v.
Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that a ban on in-person donations
“does not . . . totally prohibit a type of expression or a specific message; rather, it
merely regulates the manner in which the message may be conveyed”); see also
Tushnet, supra note 80, at 204 n.124 (noting “a pattern [among courts] in which
activities such as panhandling and ticket scalping are held to be covered by the First
Amendment, but that regulation of those activities (almost) certainly satisfies the
applicable First Amendment standards”).
189 See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he United
States Supreme Court has not . . . directly decided the question of whether the First
Amendment protects soliciting alms when done by an individual.”); Gresham v.
Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not resolved
directly the constitutional limitations on [panhandling laws] . . . as they apply to
individual beggars.”).
190 ISKCON of Potomac, Inc., 61 F.3d at 951.
191 Id. at 952.
192 Id. at 953.

2016]

PANHANDLING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1195

In analyzing the solicitation ban, the court approvingly cited
Justice Kennedy’s Krishna Consciousness concurrence for the
proposition that a prohibition on solicitation—defined as “an inperson request for immediate payment”—was a content-neutral
speech restriction.193 It also accepted the argument that the
government had a legitimate interest in preserving the Mall’s
aesthetic value and protecting visitors from undue harassment.194
The court ruled, however, that as applied, the regulation was not
narrowly tailored because ISKCON’s permit provided it access to
such a small area of the park that the government’s interests
would not be advanced through the permit’s revocation.195
Panhandling in the parks would not be rampant as a result of its
decision, the court suggested.196 While the court ruled that
prohibiting solicitation for immediate donations was content
neutral, striking down the regulation’s application for lack of
narrow tailoring meant the court believed that the First
Amendment at least covered panhandling.
In Thayer v. City of Worcester, the First Circuit, in an
opinion written by Justice Souter (who was sitting on the court by
designation), upheld two ordinances designed to deter
panhandling.197 One of the ordinances—which outlawed aggressive
panhandling or solicitation—defined “soliciting” as “using the
spoken, written, or printed word, bodily gestures, signs, or other
means of communication with the purpose of obtaining an
immediate donation of money or other thing of value.”198 While the
court conceded that panhandling for immediate donations could
express a message of need,199 it cited Justice Kennedy’s Krishna
Consciousness concurrence to assert that prohibitions on
immediate donations were not distinctions based on a message’s
content.200 The court explained that just because certain behavior
is associated with a particular subject does not mean that
regulating that behavior amounts to a content distinction.201
Censorial motive matters, said the court.202 Even when regulating
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 955.
195 Id. at 956.
196 Id.
197 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
198 Id. at 64 (emphasis added). The second ordinance prohibited someone from
walking or standing on a traffic median unless done for some “lawful purpose.” Id. at
65. That ordinance is of little relevance to this note.
199 Id. at 68 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 704-05 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
200 Id. at 69.
201 Id. at 68.
202 Id.
193

194
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expressive conduct disproportionately affects some messages and
not others, the regulation is not content based if the government
acts with the benign intent to merely eliminate undesirable
consequences arising from the speech activity—as opposed to
suppressing speech because the government disapproves of the
message.203 After finding the ordinance content neutral, the court
proceeded to reject the plaintiffs’ overbreadth, Equal Protection
Clause, and vagueness challenges.204
Obviously, the First Circuit’s reasoning, which completely
skipped over any discussion of whether the ordinance was facially
content based and instead focused primarily on the legislature’s
purpose in enacting the ban, is problematic given the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Reed. As mentioned in Section II.B, the
Court in Reed held that a benign government motive for enacting a
speech restriction does not render the restriction content neutral if
it is facially content based. In light of Reed, the Supreme Court, in
a one-paragraph opinion, vacated the First Circuit’s Thayer
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.205
B.

Circuits Rejecting Justice Kennedy’s Krishna Consciousness
Reasoning

Unlike in Thayer and ISKCON, the Sixth Circuit, in Speet
v. Schuette, failed to adopt Justice Kennedy’s argument that the
immediate receipt of funds can be separated from general
solicitation. At issue in Speet was a criminal statute that
outlawed all begging.206 While the statute did not define begging,
the court understood the term to mean “solicitation for alms.”207
By defining begging in this manner, the court created a conflict
between Schaumburg’s holding that soliciting alms is
“intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech”
and Justice Kennedy’s Krishna Consciousness concurrence—
which suggested that solicitation and the physical exchange of
cash could be separated for First Amendment purposes.208 The
court found this conflict irreconcilable and sided with the
Schaumburg characterization of solicitation as protected speech.

Id.
Id. at 72, 76.
205 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015).
206 Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013).
207 Id. at 873.
208 Id. at 876 (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
203
204
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The final court to explicitly consider Justice Kennedy’s
Krishna Consciousness concurrence was the Seventh Circuit in
Norton v. City of Springfield. Like the First Circuit’s opinion in
Thayer, the Supreme Court’s Reed decision also affected the
outcome in this case. In Norton, the Seventh Circuit initially
upheld an ordinance that prohibited panhandling in the city’s
downtown area.209 The ordinance defined “panhandling as an oral
request for an immediate donation of money.”210 Stating that
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Krishna Consciousness would
“likely [ ] carry the day” should the Supreme Court ever confront
a case about regulating panhandling in a public forum, Judge
Easterbrook, writing for the court, concluded that the regulation
was content neutral.211 The Seventh Circuit noted that there were
two categories of content-based regulations: those that “restrict[ ]
speech because of the ideas it conveys” and those that “restrict[ ]
speech because the government disapproves of its message.”212
The city’s regulation did not implicate either of these categories
because requesting immediate donations “does not express an
idea or message about politics, the arts, or any other topic on
which the government may seek to throttle expression in order to
protect itself or a favored set of speakers.”213 It simply prohibited
anyone from orally asking for an immediate donation of money for
any reason when they were downtown. Someone who wanted to
ask for money could still do so by passively holding a sign.214 Judge
Easterbrook characterized the ordinance as a subject-matter rather
than a content-based regulation.215 Because the regulation was
unconcerned with why a speaker solicited money, it was a contentneutral place-and-manner regulation that was only triggered when
a person was in a particular location (i.e., downtown).
The Seventh Circuit postponed consideration of a
rehearing petition until after the Supreme Court decided
Reed.216 Following Reed, the court granted the petition and, in
another opinion by Judge Easterbrook, reversed itself.217
Because the Supreme Court in Reed held that “regulation of
speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech
209 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717-18 (7th Cir. 2014),
overruled on rehearing by 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015).
210 Id. at 714.
211 Id. at 716.
212 Id. at 717.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 714.
215 Id. at 717.
216 Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015).
217 Id. at 413.
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because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,”
the Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the ordinance as
content neutral but subject-matter based was no longer valid.218
The Springfield ordinance did treat speech differently based on
topic, singling out oral requests for money for disfavored
treatment. As such, it could no longer be viewed as content
neutral, and because the government did not argue that it could
satisfy strict scrutiny, the court granted the injunction.219
Reed’s impact on these panhandling cases is readily
apparent. It has eviscerated any chance of the circuits adopting
Justice Kennedy’s Krishna Consciousness concurrence in cases
that involve panhandling in a public forum. Yet the Court may
eventually need to refine its decision in Reed. As already
mentioned, the Court has never answered squarely whether
regulations that single out solicitation for immediate donations
in public forums are content-based restrictions on speech. Reed
is inconsistent with the Court’s decisions in other areas of First
Amendment law. First, as discussed in Section II.B.1, if any
regulation that distinguishes speech based on topic is content
based, how can Reed be squared with cases like Central
Hudson, where the Court has held that commercial speech is
entitled to less protection than noncommercial speech?220 Isn’t a
regulation that treats commercial and noncommercial speech
differently a distinction based on subject matter? Reed suggests
that any such distinction would require strict scrutiny analysis.
Second, Reed directly conflicts with the Court’s holding in
McCullen.221 Selective exemption for abortion clinic employees
from the buffer-zone statute is a speaker-based distinction that
would appear to render the statute content based. And yet the
Court looked directly at the buffer zone’s purpose, ignoring the
facial distinction, contrary to what it would later hold in Reed.
These two decisions are inconsistent unless Justice Scalia was
correct when he wrote that “[t]here is an entirely separate,
abridged edition of the First Amendment applicable to speech
against abortion.”222 Part IV explains Reed’s potentially
devastating implications for law enforcement efforts to rein in
the negative impacts of panhandling and discusses why Reed is
not necessarily consistent with First Amendment case law.

218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 412 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
Id. at 413.
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.1.
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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REGULATING PANHANDLING AFTER REED

Over 30 years ago, James Wilson and George Kelling
explained in “Broken Windows” the negative impact that
panhandling and other disorderly conduct can have on an
urban community.223 Empirical evidence supports their theory
and shows that individuals feel intimidated when they are
approached by panhandlers and even avoid certain areas out of
fear of being approached for money.224 In a Department of
Justice (DOJ) Survey of San Francisco residents, 33% of those
surveyed admitted to giving money to panhandlers out of
intimidation, and 40% said they feared for their safety around
panhandlers.225 Panhandling can also threaten the safety of
panhandlers themselves.226 The same DOJ survey showed that
half of all panhandlers report being mugged in a given year.227
They also often get into fights with other panhandlers over
favorable territory.228
Evidence suggests that the Times Square panhandlers have
engaged in the same deleterious conduct that was described in the
DOJ survey. Polls have shown that many in the area have had
negative interactions with the panhandlers.229 As the panhandlers
have spread beyond Times Square, they have started engaging in
turf wars. For example, on one occasion, Minnie Mouse and the
Statue of Liberty broke out in fisticuffs over space in Battery
Park.230 On another occasion, one panhandler who sought money
for marijuana stabbed another panhandler in the face with a
pen.231 The government should not be powerless to rectify this
kind of violence, and the panhandlers’ proliferation demonstrates
that current regulations prohibiting aggressive panhandling are
not effectively maintaining order in New York City.
The Supreme Court has recognized the state’s legitimate
interest in “ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free
flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks [and] protecting property
See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1, at 33-34.
MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PANHANDLING 4 (2003),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/inaction1/pubs/Panhandling.pdf [http://perma.cc/GC
6Q-2F9Z].
225 Id.
226 Id. at 2.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See Li, supra note 9.
230 See Durkin et al., supra note 13.
231 Ben Yakas, Times Square “Weed Man” Arrested After Stabbing Times
Square “Beer Man,” GOTHAMIST (June 22, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://gothamist.com/
2013/06/22/times_square_weed_man_arrested_afte.php [http://perma.cc/TE2U-MHB2].
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rights.”232 In United States v. Kokinda, the Supreme Court upheld
a solicitation ban in effect in front of U.S. post offices.233 Because
the sidewalk adjacent to post offices is not a public forum, the
Court looked at whether the ban was reasonable and not
motivated by the government’s disapproval of the speaker’s
message.234 In holding that the regulation was reasonable, the
Court made the following observations about the nature of inperson solicitation: “Solicitation impedes the normal flow of
traffic,”235 “confrontation by a person asking for money disrupts
passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an
encounter with a person [merely] giving out information,”236 and
the “description of disruption and delay caused by solicitation
rings of ‘common-sense.’”237 It also accepted the following finding
from the final rule that regulated solicitation outside post offices:
Since the act of soliciting alms or contributions usually has as its
objective an immediate act of charity, it has the potentiality for evoking
highly personal and subjective reactions. Reflection usually is not
encouraged, and the person solicited often must make a hasty decision
whether to share his resources with an unfamiliar organization while
under the eager gaze of the solicitor.238

Similar reactions to speech have led the Court to determine
that two other speech categories receive no First Amendment
protection at all: true threats and fighting words.239
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014).
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 722-23 (1990).
234 Id. at 730. The level of scrutiny that a court will apply to a speech
regulation occurring on government-owned property depends on whether the
government operates the property as a proprietor or opens the space for public
discourse. Id. at 725. There is a three-part framework for determining the level of
scrutiny the court will apply. Speech regulations that occur on government property
that has historically been open for public discourse (e.g., public streets and parks) are
subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 726. When the government has affirmatively dedicated
property to First Amendment activity, regulations occurring on the property will also
be subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 726-27. Regulations that occur on public property
that the government has not expressly dedicated to speech activity, however, will be
upheld so long as they are reasonable. Id. at 727.
235 Id. at 733-34.
236 Id. at 734.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 733 (citing Conduct on Postal Property, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,824 (Aug.
31, 1978)).
239 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (stating that true threats
are unprotected, even when the speaker does not intend to carry out the threat,
because “a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence’
and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 408 (1992))); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(defining fighting words as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace” due to their tendency to cause the listener to
react violently against the speaker).
232
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Panhandling is no less disruptive, intrusive, or
intimidating in a pedestrian plaza like Times Square than it is
outside a post office. True, Times Square is a public forum, so a
more stringent standard of review will apply to regulating speech
there. But the standard set forth in Reed makes it almost
impossible for law enforcement to deal with panhandling’s
legitimately negative consequences. These negative consequences
are not inherently linked to the speaker’s message; rather, they
result from the speaker’s behavior towards other people. It does
not matter whether the panhandler wants the money to feed his
family, donate to charity, or buy drugs. It is a natural
psychological reaction for people to feel intimidated when a
stranger approaches them in a crowded place to ask for money.
The Court may have recognized the social ills that
accompany panhandling, but its decision in Reed has rendered
the government all but helpless to remedy them. The government
is now in a Catch-22 situation. If it singles out the activity that
causes the social harm—in this case soliciting accompanied by the
physical exchange of money—it has made a content-based
distinction because it differentiates between subject matter. Oral
requests for immediate payment are banned, but requests for
payment in the future are not. In this circumstance, narrow
tailoring and leaving open ample alternative communication
channels would be insufficient because content-based regulations
receive strict scrutiny. The government’s noncensorial purpose no
longer plays a role in determining what doctrinal test to apply; it
is relegated to the justification prong (i.e., whether the
government has a sufficiently compelling government interest in
regulating the speech).240 Given that the Court has only ever
upheld a content-based restriction on otherwise protected speech
in the context of national security, it is unlikely that a contentbased restriction on panhandling will be justified under Reed.241

See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2015).
See id. (“Our observation, that Springfield has attempted to write a
narrowly tailored ordinance [defining panhandling as an oral request for an immediate
donation of money] now pertains to the justification stage of the analysis rather than
the classification stage.” (citation omitted)).
241 Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled on
rehearing by Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
justification prong of content-based regulations are “met in practice only by a need as
serious as the battle against terrorists”). The Seventh Circuit in Norton was referring to
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, in which the Court upheld a content-based speech
restriction that prohibited providing material support to terrorist organizations. See Norton,
768 F.3d at 716 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010)).
239
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The flip side is that content-neutral restrictions must still
be narrowly tailored.242 As Justice Kennedy recognized in Krishna
Consciousness, efforts to prohibit all solicitation would be plainly
unconstitutional.243 That narrow tailoring requirement “thus
becomes an engine of destruction, because every effort to narrow a
rule will distinguish some speech from other speech and
so . . . doom it.”244 What is a government to do?
If the Court takes the opportunity to consider a
panhandling law similar to those at issue in Norton and Thayer,
where solicitation is defined as a request for an immediate
monetary donation, it should refine Reed. The Court in Reed found
a subject-matter distinction sufficient to constitute a content-based
regulation in the context of a sign ordinance. Distinguishing
between types of signs is much different than regulating conduct,
because the words on the sign do not combine communicative and
noncommunicative elements of expression. In other words, there
is no conduct involved. When the government regulates pure
speech, the Reed rule should apply; if the government makes
facial content-based distinctions, then it is unnecessary to look at
the government’s purpose. When speech and nonspeech elements
combine to form the same course of conduct, courts should focus
primarily on the government’s purpose in regulating the speech.
This would be consistent with O’Brien’s holding that “regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.”245 When the government singles out
panhandling for regulation, it is not targeting the speaker’s
message. It is targeting the portion of his conduct that
intimidates and delays others—his physical approach with the
intent to receive cash. This would allow law enforcement to
respond to the Times Square panhandlers more effectively.
Of course, any panhandling regulation would still need to
be narrowly tailored to carry out the government’s interest.
Blanket bans on solicitation would not be constitutional given
Schaumburg and its progeny. But limiting the activity to certain
zones or requiring solicitors to hold signs asking tourists to
242 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public
forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” (quoting
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis added))).
243 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 704 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
244 Norton, 768 F.3d at 715.
245 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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approach them would achieve the government’s legitimate
objectives of preserving order and the flow of pedestrian traffic, as
well as reduce possible instances of fraud or duress. The
government also could not outright ban the panhandlers from
wearing costumes or going topless. One can reasonably argue that
engaging in those activities alone constitutes a form of artistic
expression. But eliminating the economic incentive to engage in
the activity would likely deter at least some of the panhandlers
that swarm Times Square today.
CONCLUSION
Broken Windows policing and the First Amendment are
not necessarily enemies. Regulating expressive conduct to target
harmful behavior without singling out a particular message
reconciles one with the other. We live in a pluralistic society. The
policies behind protecting free speech in the first place—selfgovernance, truth-seeking, self-restraint, and respect for
individual autonomy—require that we often tolerate people whom
we find disagreeable. But that does not mean that the public must
become victims of disorderly conduct. Spider-Man is reducing the
quality of life in New York City with his antics. It is about time
the law recognizes that we are not powerless to stop him.
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